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Morocco is situated in a peculiar geo-political position, which makes it a 
catalyst of Western attention. This position is not only represented by the 
spatial proximity to Europe and the few kilometres of sea that  separate it 
from Spain. The closeness to Europe and the western world is political and 
economic. Despite the lack of a vast amount of natural resources1 as in 
Algeria, the country has been integrated in the international economy for 
most of its post-independence existence.  
This not only for being favourable to some sort of a market economy2, but 
most of all for its links with the West. In the last years this geostrategic 
relevance for the American and European interests has been increasing  due 
to the “necessity of reliable partners in a volatile region”3. “Morocco is 
generally well respected by world powers as a stable constitutional 
monarchy… and an Islamic voice of moderation”4. This fundamental 
characteristic of Morocco, the fact that is an Arab-Islamic country with 
western pronounced features, makes it a fundamental bridge with the Arab 
world for the EU and the US5.  
The US after having lost credibility with the campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, needs now more than ever the support of the Moroccan regime 
to take part in the dialogue which involves the region, and so they granted 
Morocco major non-Nato ally status in June 20046.  
Everything is explained much better if we recall the relatively good 
relationship between Morocco and Israel. Although the natural and genetic 
brakes in the relations of the two states, as the Moroccan Islamic sensibility 
first of all, the interaction between Morocco and Israel still continues on a 
positive binary, promoted by the confluent interest of both. For the 
Moroccan authorities, a positive attitude towards Israel and the pacific 
conclusion of its conflict are useful for “bolstering the country’s image in 
                                                          
1
 Except for poliphosphates  10) p.106 
2 Cavatorta(2005);  p.556  
3 Ibid 
4 Howe(2001); p.59 
5 www.state.gov 
6 www.fco.gov.uk 
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the West and bringing in foreign currency” 7.  
So we arrive to a crucial point. Morocco owes its importance and its 
sparkling inclusion in the Western economic market to this image that it has 
been able to build during its post-independence history.  
The image of an economic liberal, pro-Western and Islamic-moderate 
country in a democratizing process makes it attractive not only for tourists, 
but for the USA, the EU and Israel policymakers as well.  
The problem is the following: in order to maintain this façade, Morocco had 
and still has to face very strong challenges like terrorism, Islamism and the 
democratisation issues. This paper aims to analyze how the country is 
dealing with these issues and how the image that it wants to show for 
maintaining its international relations influenced its attitude towards those 
questions.  
The analysis focuses on  how Morocco responded to those three challenges.   
Exploring these issues, terrorism (par. 2), Islamism (par. 3) and 
democratisation (par. 4) I  will highlight the particular attitude that it took, 
which I would define the Moroccan cosmetic approach.  
 
Terrorism and Islamism 
 
Terrorism in Morocco has gained the international attention after the two 
outrages on May 16 2003 and April 2007, both occurred in Casablanca8.  
What is very important to stress, especially in relation to our discourse, is 
that the  terrorist attacks in Morocco are unlikely to be the outcome of a 
strong presence of trans-national terrorist movements in its territory9. In all 
the attacks “there has been no real evidence of instrumental trans-national 
links”10. 
I suppose that we cannot really know if the frightening example of Algeria 
warned the local society from this kind of extremism, or if the authoritarian 
presence of the state prevented it, but in Morocco “such extremism has only 
                                                          
7 Maddy-Weitzman (1996); p.36 
8 Le Sage(2007); p.1 
9 Pargeter(2005); p.6 
10 Joffè(2007); p.69 
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been a marginal event”11.   
The international links of the groups that set up the attacks seem to be a 
sympathy or inspiration tie, but surely not a command-and-control linkage12. 
This is correct for the other terrorist cells that the State has discovered and 
dismantled in the last years13.  
To address the problem, the King adopted an holistic approach.  
He made a spectacular reform in the religious field1415. 
He passes an anti-terrorism law16 which free the hands of the armed forces 
and which is in some parts stronger than the USA Patriotic Act. The law 
permitted a strong repression, with the ban of an Islamist party in 2008, with 
the arrest of more than 3,000 people and with the pretended elimination of 
60 terrorist cells17.  
A disproportionate result, considering the small dimension of the radical 
Islamism in Morocco and considering that the organizations of the terrorist 
attacks of 2003 and 2007 are more characterized by a familiar dimension 
than a tentacular widespread size18. In the conviction of an important rule of 
poverty in the spreading of terrorism, Morocco launched the National 
Initiative for Human Development (INDH, in the French acronym) and a 
powerful program to eradicate its cities shantytowns, replacing slums with 
social housing, a showy operation of makeup of the main urban centres.  
It is clear, in my opinion, that such a strong and holistic reaction in front of 
the onset of the terrorism phenomenon, reveals the fear of the Kingdom in 
front of a problem that can deeply mine the pillars of the external image of 
Morocco, not only in a tourist investments perspective.  
Morocco’s government has tried several times to tie  terrorism to 
international linkages, in order to contextualize the issue. But “when 
international linkages were found hard to prove, terrorism started to be more 
                                                          
11 Ibid 
12 Kalpakian(2008); p.4 
13 As the Ansar al-Mahdi Organization in 2006, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group in 2007 and 
the Bellijerai Organization in 2008.  Ibid 
14 The Habous(2006) 
15 For instance, after the reform the right to issue a fatwa in Morocco is the monopoly or the state 
body, an opinion issued by rogue clerics are not only unofficial but also illegal. 
16 Law 03.03 of 29/05/2003 
17 The Economist(2008) 
18 Kalpakian(2008); p.3 
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and more associated with radicalism and the focus on the roots of radicalism 
soon identified in political Islamism”19.  
So the problem shifted to the way to deal with the Islamist movements 
present in Morocco.  
A particular way has been promoted by the US, that adopted the view that 
some handy Islamist groups should not only be included in the democratic 
process, but also incentivised as the last remedy against violent radicalism: 
“The PJD can act as a buffer against Al-Qaeda inspired groups that seeks to 
mobilize the poorest and most marginalize. That is what the US seems to 
think”20. According to some: “increased political participation by moderate 
Islamist groups is the best way to curb the growth of extremism in 
Morocco” 21. 
So King Mohamed VI adopted an ambiguous attitude towards the Islamist 
movements, swinging from repression, quite traditional and usual during his 
father’s reign, to co-option, particularly fomented by the US.  
After the attacks of May 2003, the US continued to support PJD whereas the 
Moroccan political leaders where calling for its dismantlement22 and the 
temptation of banning it was extremely high23; the American Ambassador 
Margaret Tutweiller intervened with the support of the US administration to 
prevent this to happen24.  The interest of the US for the PJD was too high, as 
a tool to “show that it has no problem with Islam. So it is encouraging the 
PJD model as a moderate Islamist model for other Arab and Muslim”25.  
Thus, on one hand the Civilized Alternative Party, which was between the 
three Islamist parties allowed to operate legally, has been banned last year 
for an alleged link between its leader and the Bellijari terrorist network26; on 
the other hand, the PJD had to be completely co-opted by the King, as we 
will see more in detail.  
 
                                                          
19 Bartolucci(2008); p.13 
20 Kristianasen(2008) 
21 Pingree-Abend(2005) 
22 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.24 
23 The Economist(2008) 
24 Pingree-Abend(2005) 
25 Kristianasen(2008) 
26 The Economist(2008) 
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ISLAMISM 
 
 
To understand why the in the Moroccan history Islamist movements are so 
moderate or marginal, radicalised and repressed, in comparison with the 
Algerian and other experiences, we have to analyze the structural peculiarity 
of the Moroccan State.  
Remembering that it is the only monarchy in Africa, the political institutions 
of Morocco emerged almost unscathed from the colonial period. France has 
always shown a great respect for the political internal structure and this 
assured its preservation until the independence in 1956. The Moroccan 
sultanate astutely realized that its interests were going hand in hand with the 
interests of the Istqlal, the nationalist movement, nowadays the leading 
political party. As a result, the monarchy came out from the colonial era as 
the dominant of the political scene.   
The Sultan was also traditionally the leader of  its Muslim community, with 
the supreme title of Commander of the believers, amir al-mu’minin.  Given 
the legacy of its past as Caliphate, the King has still religious supremacy27 
and he is considered direct descendant of the Prophet28. 
All this demonstrates the monolithic monarchic power that the king enjoys, 
based on the double legitimation in the religious and the political field.  
The supremacy and the incredible prestige of the King, recognized and 
bestowed by the Moroccan people to its leader, is a possible factor that 
prevented the country from experiences like the “Islamist derive” of its 
neighbour Algeria. This is a possible factor of the marginalization of the 
Islamic activism, that could and can move only in the narrow space left by 
the monarchy.  
This space spreads between two poles represented by one side a moderate 
and quiescent approach, fated to the co-option; on the other side its opposite, 
a radicalization, with possible terrorist outcomes but inevitable short life, 
which goes against the regime that always immediately nips every dissent in 
the bud. That explains also the dualistic approach of the Kingdom towards 
                                                          
27 Joffè(2007); p.67 
28 Bartolucci(2008);p.14 
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Islamism: co-optation or repression29.  
This does not imply that Morocco is not sensible to the appeal of Islamism 
for many reasons. The favourable international climate, given the spread of 
the feeling of a “failure of ideologies imported from the west combined with 
perceived great Islamic victories”30; the increasing impatience towards the 
Western mistakes made in Islamic countries as Iraq and Afghanistan; 
specifically in Morocco, the unbridled neo-liberal economic policies that the 
country carries out which require inevitable economic and social costs; the 
“consequent emergence of a small nouveaux riches class, while the vast 
majority of the population struggles to survive”31. The wish to attract 
foreign incomes, mostly but not only in the tourist sector, attracts as well the 
contradictions that the western values produce in their contact with the 
Islamic ones. The massive influence of the western  standards brought in the 
country by the economy creates a particular and ambiguous relation with the 
Islamic tradition.  
With a capitalization of the negative consequences of the economic reforms, 
Islamism can exploit them to gain ground. 
Given the lower weight of the extremist fringe of the representatives of 
Islamism32, almost all of them imprisoned or hunted by the  government as a 
reaction to the terrorist attacks, I will narrow the focus on the moderate 
components of Islamism in Morocco.  
The moderate scene is formed essentially33 by the “Parti de Justice et de 
developpement” (PJD) and the al-‘Adl wa’l-Ishan or Justice and Charity 
(JC) of the Sheik Abdesslam Yacine, ruled nowadays by his daughter Nadia.  
The JC closely adheres to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
relation with the peaceful Islamisation of society as a preparatory stage to 
the construction of an Islamic polity. Born with a marginal position, during 
the years the movement has gained an important moral stature, particularly 
after the clash between Yacine and King Hassan, a clash which is steadily 
decreasing by the time .  
                                                          
29 Joffè(2007); p.67 
30 Cavatorta(2005);p.19 
31 Daoud(1999);p.1 
32 Ansar al-Mahdi Organization, Bellijerai Organization, al-Sirat Mustquim of Miloudi… 
33 It includes the old movement of Sheik al-Zamzani, now of minor importance 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The PJD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The organization is pacific and completely apolitical. The movement in fact 
eschewed the democratic option but it is now stressing the necessity of a 
pluralist political society. Anyway, it has been until now denied registration 
as a formal political party34. 
The government threatened to ban JC for certain statements of its leader, but 
it dropped its plan, thanks also to the US pressures; the movement rests 
barely tolerated by the Kingdom but not prosecuted, for its scarce interest in 
the political sphere and its concentrations on social activities. It does not  
seem able to take part in the formal political life in a short term and it is 
substantially become inoffensive35. 
Born from radical movements, comprehensive of armed wings, in strong 
contrast with the Kingdom, PJD has moderated its position until it has been 
be co-opted, obtaining the possibility to enjoy  the formal political process. 
It has in fact participated in the elections of 2002 and 2007 with an 
unexpected success36.  
Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that during the local elections of 2003,  
under government pressure in response to the terrorist attacks37, it had to 
reduce the number of its candidates, which couldn’t run in all constituencies, 
in order to “avoid sweeping the board and embarrassing the King with 
significant Islamist electoral victory”38.  
The co-option and the efforts to reach it as a goal, heavily conditioned the 
program of the party. In the attempt to appear as a reliable partner for a 
political dialogue, the Party left the notion of being depositary of religious 
truth, developing a cultural and political compromise, abandoning the 
purpose to create an Islamic state that nowadays they assert still exist: as a 
PJD representative said “In Morocco it was Amir Al-Mouminine who 
guaranteed compliance of laws with the state’s Islamic standards. We do not 
have to build it (the Islamic state) since it already exists. The constitution 
itself states that Morocco is an Islamic state”39.   
                                                          
34 Joffè(2007); p.68 
35 Ibid 
36 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.26 
37 Condemned officially by the Party 
38 Laskier(2003); p.4 
39 La vie économique(2004) 
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“PJD is contextually leaving behind religious areas for more political and 
secular issues. What is more, PJD is also adjusting its political program to 
its government’s public policies”40. The co-option influence is reflected by 
the evanescent political program of the party, based on pure pragmatism, 
impossible to identify with a precise ideology and rather related to some 
general principles that can change according to the political circumstances.  
The necessity of PJD to be distinguished as Islamic party and to continue to 
be a reference for its audience is limited to its proposed image of defender of 
the Islam virtue, with insistence on the defence of moral dictates. They can 
for instance propose to ban the sale of wine, or  accuse the decadence of the 
moral for the promiscuity on beaches, or prohibit a certain film, but those 
are all contingent occasions for the PJD to appear as the “defender of 
Islamic values at low cost, and in a consensual way, as the positions 
converge with conservative and traditionalist wings of opinion in the 
country… But this issue remains quite vague and can be summed up as a 
position of principle and a profession of faith to the masses more than a real 
work of political theology”41. PJD, as Islamist party, is proceeding towards 
the way that lead to be a mere Islamic party as the traditional ones on which 
the Moroccan authoritarian pluralism is based.   
The nature of the PJD seems to have been irremediably captured in the 
tearing dilemma of an Islamist party that has to deal with its religious 
essence to maintain its popular consensus and the necessary transformations 
that the political scene implies in the masked dictatorial Moroccan 
framework and the co-option process.  
“The force of protest and radicalism of these parties (PJD and JC) has been 
domesticated and neutralised by the state in order to control them better”42. 
But the transformation of the PJD and of the JC is also driven by the 
international attention that they enjoy and that they are at the same time 
trying to draw. PJD and JC are “anxious to attract international approval for 
their positions and are willing to engage with western politicians and the 
media…. They look to Europe and the United States for support and 
                                                          
40 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.12 
41 Ibid 
42 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.9 
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engagement. As such both seek to put forward the image of modern 
movements based on political Islam”43, “their aim is to appear as respectable 
agents of change”44.  
USA need this dialogue with the moderate Moroccan Islam, for their 
political strategy in the region, for the necessity to show a positive attitude 
towards Islam, to revive their role in the Middle-East starting from the 
extreme periphery, to open windows of communication in the Arab world, 
where they are more and more losing ground and credibility45.  
According to the American aim to promote an Islam favourable to the US, 
the PJD has benefited from training programs open to all parties, 
participating in an enormous amount of meetings and colloquia with US 
politicians; it has been supported in crisis moments (as in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks in 2003) 46 and it has been consulted frequently by 
American diplomats on Morocco’s political situation47. “In exchange PJD 
has never failed to encourage prospects for economic cooperation between 
Morocco and the US”48. Following the wake of the US example, the EU is 
now shiny looking to PJD and JC as possible conversation partners to 
implement its political plan for the region (ENP). 
The EU’s shyness towards the Moroccan Islamist currents is criticized by 
the same PJD and JC, that complain that “the EU has fallen well behind the 
US in terms of engagement with Morocco Islamists”49.  
The  EU  since the ‘90s has been  more concerned about the political 
instability of the Maghrebi area and the onset of the phenomenon of 
terrorism, prioritizing a policy centred on security and stability of the region, 
with very little propensity to include Islamist components in the negotiations 
and initiatives50.  
But the partial failure of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership51 (EMP) drove 
Europe to rethink its Mediterranean policy, conceiving the European 
                                                          
43 Joffè(2007); p.71 
44 Pingree-Abend(2005) 
45 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.17 
46 Ibid p.18 
47 Pingree-Abend(2005) 
48 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.22 
49 Pingree-Abend(2005) 
50 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p. 1 
51 See  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm 
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Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)52, based on the offer of a stronger political 
partnership and economic integration through positive conditionality on the 
commitment on common values, in particular democratisation and human 
rights.  
“One of the main aspects of the European Union’s new Neighbourhood 
Policy towards country of the Maghreb is the strengthening of the process of 
democratisation”53.  
JC and PJD are the only, although maybe not so powerful, form of 
opposition to the regime; so it is natural that the internal and external 
pressure on the EU, to include them in the democratisation discourse 
implicated in the ENP, is growing too much to rest easily unheard.  The 
ENP can have a real impact on the Moroccan reality of democratisation only 
integrating the Islamist moderate movements that represent a “non-
negotiable part of public opinion and enjoy popular support.... Multiplying 
interlocutors in the framework of EMP and ENP would force the Moroccan 
regime to take greater account of EU recommendations concerning 
democracy and economy”54.   
The engagement of the US with the Islamist currents of Morocco can 
influence the EU in its attitude. But the result can be very limited for the 
particular combination of the EU policies (EMP and ENP) towards 
Maghreb, which aims, in the long-term, to reach security and economic 
development through  the promotion of democratisation and human rights. 
The way in which the two policies have been combined in the last years 
suggests that they are more competing than strengthening one another.  
The prevalence of the security and economic agenda can “minimise the lack 
of new proposals for democratisation and participation in political process 
by civil society and Islamists”55; that mortifying the innumerable efforts that 
the Moroccan moderate Islamists are making to appear as desirable 
conversation partners, modifying their attitudes towards Europe and the 
Moroccan government.  These considerations give us a bridge for the next 
                                                          
52 See  http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm 
53 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p. 1 
54 Amghar(2007); p.10 
55 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.22 
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step in our discourse: the problem of democratisation.  
 
DEMOCRATISATION  
 
The ascent of King Mohammed VI, after the iron regime of his father 
Hassan II, has been publicised as a shift in a series of political changes, 
started before his investiture, that would place Morocco on the path of a real 
democracy. The new King bolstered those expectations in an early moment 
with various showy gestures: for instance, he permitted the return of several 
opposition figures, many of them with experiences of political imprisonment 
and he fired the omnipotent Minister of Interior, Driss Basri, symbol of the 
old regime’s human rights abuses56.  
An exemplar case, which explains how the illusions were destined to clash 
with the reality of a mere embellishment of the previous status quo, is the 
Commission d’arbitrage. In the attempt to build a state of law, Mohammed 
VI ordered to create an independent Indemnity Commission (Commission 
d'arbitrage), in order to indemnify  victims of forcible disappearance and 
arbitrary detention during “les années de plomb” of his father Hassan II. But 
“the Moroccan Indemnity Commission began at the end - with indemnities - 
of any genuine truth and reconciliation process... There are no public 
hearings, no attempts to provide the nation with an account of the past and 
blanket amnesties were declared as part of the creation of the Indemnity 
Commission…. No one has been tried and crimes are considered 
unproven”57 
Some few progresses have been made in the field of freedom of expression 
and association, but after a few months,  there has been a sharp roll-back58.  
The publicized progress appears more an adjustment of the democratic 
Moroccan façade rather than a real structural change towards 
democratisation. 
Same conclusion we can make for the pluralism in the political process, as 
                                                          
56 Slyomovics(2001); p.19 
57 Ibid  
58 See for instance the freedom of press and the ban of two indipendent weekly publications in 
Sweet(2001); pg. 25 
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we have seen in the case of the co-option of the Islamist Parties, the real 
possible opposition, where the iron hand of the Kingdom influences so 
much the nature of the opposition to make it an instrument of maintenance 
of the status quo.  
The Moroccan activism in the political sphere remains almost totally 
undeveloped, for the great historical legacy of repression and political 
action59. There is still a deep mistrust related to the idea of reforming the 
state within it, that neither the Islamists seem to be able to tarnish. There is 
still the conception that what is politics has not to interest, because politics 
“is conceived of as something which is automatically in opposition to the 
state”60.  
“A tacit rule of the new political climate is that activists should not hold 
spontaneous demonstrations… While this conflict revealed that activists 
would be punished if they speak too loudly, it made it equally clear that the 
government would reward them with lucrative and prestigious positions if 
they were willing to moderate and keep their aims non political”61. The 
previous formula has been used for various movements, as women 
associations and human rights groups. The co-option strategy is expanding 
beyond the Islamist groups.  
“Morocco has unquestionably seen improvements in civil liberties in the 
past several years....but the expansion of political liberties has lagged far 
behind. In spite of the impressive array of democratic-looking institutions62, 
no significant power has devolved outside the regime”63. Not one of the 
changes has touched the supra-institutional power of the King but, that is 
worse, the changes appear more a cosmetic make-up of the existing 
situation64.  
The government is trying to draw attention to its democratisation efforts, 
aware of the potentiality that derive in order to attract foreign capitals.  “So 
it would be incorrect to characterize Morocco’s recent political evolution as 
                                                          
59 Burton-Rose(1998); p. 8 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
62 As the bicameral parliament, multiparty electoral competition and the legal presence of the  PJD  
63 Sweet(2001); p.22 
64 Cavatorta(2005); p. 47 
13 
 
 
 
Role of 
inter-
national 
pressures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
democratisation. To the contrary, many of these democratic changes have 
instead solidified the monarchy’s position as the first among institutions” 65. 
The central point is that Morocco is answering to international pressure for 
democratisation that does not require an enormous effort and a structural 
and real change. Those pressures are in fact demanding a mere cosmetic 
approach that the country is properly realising.  
A first order of pressure, and maybe the most negligible, can be identified 
with the collapse of socialism and a certain necessity “to adapt domestic and 
economic institutions to the winning values of democracy and liberalism to 
profit from the new-look international system”66. The second order of 
pressure is the privileged relation that Morocco maintains with the EU and 
the US. 
Among the Mediterranean partners, Morocco has been the first beneficiary67 
of the European financing68. The Kingdom is basically following the calls of 
the EU and the primacy of the democratisation issue in the ENP and EMP 
perspective. But a real conditionality has never been imposed for the 
continuance of such a good relationship; a superficial climate of democratic 
transition, in which it is possible to properly collocate also the inclusion 
through co-option of the Islamist moderate currents, seems to be enough for 
both69.  
The same happened for the USAID assistance program dating back to 
195370. Something similar for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB), which supervised in the ‘80s a far-reaching program 
of economic reforms. Morocco has been the first North-African country 
engaged in SAPs. But at the time, unlike nowadays, IMF and WB were not 
interested with the political changes that should go along with economic 
reforms. The aggressive liberalization process had such an extraordinary 
result71 that Morocco is still continuing in this way and searching for further 
implementations.  
                                                          
65 Burton-Rose(2008); p. 
66 Cavatorta(2005); p. 17 
67 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.22 
68 With 1.1 billion of euros committed from 1995 to 2004 
69 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.9 
70 www.state.gov 
71 Cavatorta(2005); p. 14 
14 
 
Lack of 
con-
ditionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The traditional allies of Morocco in its economic paths have never posed a 
real conditionality to partnership or aids, related to democratisation or 
political changes. On the contrary the US and the EU, have always  been  
somehow worried about the regional stability where a substantially 
authoritarian Morocco, with a pure façade of democracy, can play an 
exemplary role. For this reason Morocco continued in great extent to benefit 
from international engagements without any real pressure for a democratic 
transition.  
It has been a clear tendency from western countries to support certain 
authoritarian regimes, able to control and, if necessary, suppress Islamist 
acmes, in order to maintain the stability necessary to play an active role and 
extract benefits from the region.  
What was better than Morocco, an authoritarian regime, with a democratic 
make up, particularly disposed to liberalization and open economy, even in 
positive relations with Israel?   
“In sum, dependence on foreign loans” (and external relations for the 
market) “could lead Morocco to face enormous issues of conditionality, but 
external actors do not use this potential tool of pressure…. All leading 
external actors guarantee political legitimacy because for its principal allies 
and economic partners (US, EU and France) Morocco seems to be an 
example that needs to be followed (by other countries in the Region)”72.  
It is so a probable conclusion that this factor well explains why Morocco has 
been approaching democratisation in its particular cosmetic manner; and it 
is in this scenery that it is proper to collocate the recent co-option tendency, 
used by the Kingdom towards Islamist actors, to control them and, in the 
meanwhile, to establish a “superficial climate of democratic transition”73.  
In this perspective, peace and security are not pursued throughout the 
spreading of democracy or similar values. They are reached  trough a coat of 
liberal paint, not to compromise the possibility to prevent the spreading of 
non-tamable Islamism, which had been worrying more than the authoritarian 
nature of its controller.  
External actors have strengthened the present status quo with their narrow 
                                                          
72 Vermeren(2002); p.222 
73 Boubekeur-Amghar(2006); p.9 
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focus on economic openness and façade democracy. Free trade agreements, 
granted credits and loans are all measures that could be potentially have 
been used as carrots to promote democratic change and have actually ended 
to be a support for the Moroccan kingdom. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
To sum up, Morocco is an exemplar case of mutual interaction between 
Islamism, Democratisation and external environment. It has been 
influenced, in order to maintain its international relations, to make apparent 
democratic adjustments to its façade, but it has never been egged on real 
structural changes. The risk was to jeopardize the authoritarianism, useful to 
control Islamist shakes. 
As a result, repression or co-option have continued to be the only two 
possible perspectives for Islamist actors, in front of a total governmental 
lack of genuine desire about a democratic inclusion. The same co-option is a 
cosmetic means to feign democratic attitudes.  
I analyzed how the Moroccan Islamist movements have been changed after 
getting in touch with the national and international political arena; we can 
assume that if the western concern was to prevent that Islamism could 
change politics, it happened the contrary, because politics changed 
Islamism.  
Moreover this was the cost of a particular transaction:  repression and co-
option are the tools of the Moroccan cosmetic attitude, the two sides of the 
same coin used as currency for foreign relations with the West.  
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